The biomethane value chain, and where Salerno stands in it
Two stages of the six are vacant in Southern Thailand, and they are the two worth taking; profit concentrates in the two that are already held.
▸Who holds each stage, and what characterizes it
- Who holds it today
- 70 Southern Thai mills, independently owned
- What characterizes it
- Fragmented upstream. No mill is large enough to matter alone, which is a supply risk rather than buyer power
- Who holds it today
- The mills, at about 60% of them
- What characterizes it
- Already built where it exists. The other 40% would need capital before they can supply anything
- Who holds it today
- Nobody, in Southern Thailand, on the searches below
- What characterizes it
- Vacant. This is the position available to take, and the most valuable finding in this section
- Who holds it today
- Not searched separately
- What characterizes it
- Inseparable from upgrading in practice, so it is treated as vacant where upgrading is, which is an inference rather than a finding
- Who holds it today
- PETRONAS Gas and Gas Malaysia by pipe; Straits Bio-LNG and shipowners by sea
- What characterizes it
- Concentrated downstream, and regulated. Buyer power sits here
- Who holds it today
- Four licensed term LNG importers, plus sandbox-allocated generators
- What characterizes it
- Highly concentrated downstream. Entry is by license or by contract with a licensee
Six stages carry a molecule from a palm plantation to a Singapore burner tip.
The vacancy at stages three and four is the section's most consequential claim, so here is what was searched for it. Searching for operating biomethane upgrading in Surat Thani, Krabi and Songkhla returns POME biogas plants but no upgrading: Asia Biogas runs Krabi Waste to Energy, Southern Palm operates a covered-lagoon digester in Surat Thani, and three registered projects in the South process about 850,000 tonnes of fresh fruit bunch a year into 4.7 MW of generation. The one Thai plant found that upgrades biogas to biomethane is Asia Biogas's compressed biomethane facility at Rayong, commissioned June 2019, which is not in the South (Asia Biogas). So the South has biogas and generation, and no upgrading. The claim is that the upgrading stage is vacant, not that nothing is happening.
Salerno holds none of these today. It holds relationships with stage one, an engineering capability that can build stages three and four, and a trading platform that could contract stage six.
The two vacant stages are the position worth taking, and they are neighbouring, so the candidate run is upgrading plus aggregation. That is the run this memo recommends. The alternative run, extending downstream through liquefaction and shipping into stage five, is the one the client's own plan prices, and section 13 shows it does not pay.
Selling gas into a pipeline and selling the same gas as bio-LNG to a bunker customer are not the same stage. They are separated by a liquefaction plant, which costs $11.81M at the first-phase scale and $4.00/MMBtu to run. Where Salerno stands is the same in both; what it must build is not, and the difference is the largest single number in this case.
Profit concentrates at stage six and at stage five, both of which are held. That is the structural problem with this business: the stages that are open are the ones where value is thinnest, and the stages where value is thick are licensed, capital-intensive, or both.
Section added · Every later judgment about where to participate is read against it, and a reader assembling it from scattered mentions assembles a different chain each time